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State v. Lewis, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 13 (March 13, 2008)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – APPEALS 
 
Summary 
 
 State appealed a district court order granting Defendant’s presentence motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  The Nevada Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether granting a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is independently 
appealable.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court granted Lewis’s motion to dismiss on the basis that 
the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.  The Court held that an order granting a 
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is an intermediate order and cannot be 
independently appealed.  There is no statute or rule allowing the State to appeal from an 
intermediate order granting the defendant the right to withdraw a guilty plea before 
sentencing.        
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 Lewis was charged with several counts of sexual assault and lewdness with a 
minor.  Lewis entered into a plea agreement stating he was eligible for probation if, after 
evaluation, it was determined that he did not have a high risk of reoffending.  Lewis then 
made a motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing, arguing that his plea was 
unknowing because the probation terms were misrepresented to him.  The district court 
granted Defendant’s motion to withdraw.   
 The State appealed and Lewis filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the order 
was intermediate and therefore not a final, appealable determination.  
 
Discussion   
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court derives its appellate jurisdiction from statutes or 
court rules.2  Thus, if no statute or court rule provides for a certain appeal, then the right 
to appeal does not exist.3   
 NRS 177.015 is the primary criminal appeals statute and does not provide the 
Court jurisdiction to review an order granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.  District 
court orders that may be reviewed under NRS 177.015(1)(b) include: grants of motions to 
dismiss, motions of acquittal, motions in arrest or judgment, or grants or refusals of new 
trials.   
                                                 
1 By Holly Ludwig. 
2 Castillo v. State, 106 Nev. 349, 352-53, 792 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1990).  
3 Id.  
 The State argued that an order granting a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is the functional equivalent of an order granting a motion for a new trial and is 
therefore appealable under NRS 177.015(1)(b).4  In Hargrove, the court allowed its 
jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a district court order denying a post-conviction 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea.5  A post-conviction motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 
substantially similar to a motion for a new trial because both motions are made after 
conviction and challenge the basis of the finding of guilt.6  Moreover, an order denying a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea before the judgment is entered can be reviewed on 
direct appeal from the conviction as an intermediate order.7 
 The Court rejects the State’s argument, finding that an order granting a 
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not analogous to an appealable order 
granting a motion for a new trial.  Only orders granting or denying post-judgment 
motions for a new trial are appealable.8  The Court holds that it only has jurisdiction to 
hear appeals of district court orders resolving post-conviction motions for a new trial or 
its functional equivalents.9  Any order entered before the conviction is intermediate and 
therefore not a final, appealable issue.  This holding is grounded in policies of promoting 
judicial economy and avoiding piecemeal appellate review.10  This rule does not unduly 
prejudice the State because it is free to enter into a new plea bargain if such an order is 
granted or it may proceed to trial.  Additionally, if the trial court exceeds its judicial 
discretion in allowing a defendant to withdraw his plea before sentencing, the State has 
the option of filing a petition for extraordinary relief in the Nevada Supreme Court.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear this matter 
because the State’s appeal from an order granting a presentence motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea is an intermediate order.  Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.   
                                                 
4 Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 686 P.2d 222 (1984).  
5 Id. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.  
6 Id. at 501, 686 P.2d at 224. 
7 Id. at 502 n.3, 686 P.2d at 225 n.3; see also Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 191 n.15, 87 P.3d 533, 537 
n.15 (2004); Lee v. State, 115 Nev. 207, 210, 985 P.2d 164, 166 (1999).  
8 Reno Hilton Resort Corp. v. Verderber, 121 Nev. 1, 203, 106 P.3d 134, 135 (2005) 
9 Id.  
10 See Id.  
